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Studies of partisan identification in the U.S. have concentrated on Anglo Americans. We argue that
by focusing only on the descendents of naturalized, mostly white, immigrants, that previous research
may have been biased toward largely sociological accounts for the development of partisan attitudes.
Here we study the partisan affiliations of Latino voters and argue that by examining their partisan
attitudes we should find that their partisanship is more explicitly political than Anglos. We utilize a
telephone survey of Latino likely voters in the 2000 presidential election and find that Latino voter
partisanship is shaped by both political and social factors.
The 2000 presidential election saw unprecedented appeals by both the Bush and
Gore campaigns for Latino votes. Both campaigns used Spanish language adver-
tisements and made special efforts to establish connections with Latino political
and media elites. This is not surprising on the part of the Democrats since the
Latino community has historically voted strongly Democratic (DeSipio 1996; de
la Garza, García, and DeSipio 1992; García and de la Garza 1977). But by making
a direct effort to court the Latino vote, Republicans in 2000 clearly believed they
could make significant inroads into this segment of the electorate. Many Repub-
licans, especially in the Southwest, continue to argue that Latino socioeconomic
mobility and social conservatism make them ripe for Republican “conversion.”
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This belief on the part of Republican strategists raises a number of important
research questions. First, has Democratic partisanship in the Latino electorate
eroded to the point where a sizeable number of Latino votes can be won by
Republican appeals? Second, are Latino voter party identifications more mal-
leable and potentially influenced by short-term political and economic factors
than those of other groups? Much of the early work argued that partisanship is a
long-term and stable political affiliation, not easily altered by political campaigns
or direct issue appeals (Campbell et al. 1960; Miller and Shanks 1996). Is this
true for the Latino electorate, or is the Latino political experience so different
from the dominant Anglo experience to render moot generalizations from earlier
studies of Anglo political affiliations to the Latino electorate?
We argue that Latinos constitute an important demographic group and that the
study of their partisan and other political attitudes provides critical tests of exist-
ing political theory (García Bedolla 1999; Hero 1992). The Latino population in
the United States contains three main groups: non-naturalized immigrants; natu-
ralized immigrants; and the native born, which include the descendents of immi-
grants and those present in the Southwest at the time of annexation. Most research
on political attitudes in the United States has focused on Anglo Americans, who
look most like the third group, the native born. But by focusing only on the
descendents of naturalized, largely white, immigrants, previous party identifica-
tion research may have been biased toward sociological explanations, given 
that the mostly Anglo respondents had had longer socialization experiences in
America. In contrast, newly naturalized American citizens often enter American
politics without well-formed political attitudes learned through social mecha-
nisms. Thus, it is possible that immigrant Latinos might initially develop their
partisanship through more explicitly political means than Anglos.
These important research questions form the basis for the research we report
in this article. Using a telephone survey of Latino likely voters during the 2000
election, we examine the correlates of Latino voter partisanship in this most
recent election. In the next section, we discuss the literature on partisanship and
the underlying logic for the model we test. Then we outline the data set we use
and discuss our basic methodology. Next, we present our results, and we con-
clude that Latino voter partisanship is influenced most by political and social
factors.
Party Identification and Latinos
The main debate regarding the nature of partisanship in American politics has
centered on how stable partisan attachments are over time. This debate originates
in The American Voter, where Campbell et al. (1960) posited a political social-
ization model of partisanship: party identification constitutes an affective attach-
ment to a social group, in this case a party. These attachments are learned early
in life, often at a pre-political age, and remain stable over time (Abramson and
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Ostrom 1991; Green and Palmquist 1990; Miller 1991). In this model, change
results from great personal changes, like marriage, or from exceptional political
changes, such as the Civil War. Since these events do not happen often, they see
political events as having little effect on the evolution of an individual’s party
identification.
Revisionists have argued that party identification is not nearly as stable as 
the traditionalists have led us to believe and that identification is more malleable
than the traditional model has assumed (Fiorina 1981; Franklin 1984; Franklin
and Jackson 1983; Markus and Converse 1979; McKuen, Erikson, and Stimson
1989). These scholars see party identification as a more dynamic process, driven
by issues ranging from retrospective political and economic evaluations (Fiorina),
past votes (Markus and Converse), and policy perspectives (Franklin and
Jackson). While they may disagree on the agents driving change, they argue that
political events do affect the nature and strength of party identification and that
Americans sometimes do switch their party affiliation during their lifetimes.
Despite the fact that partisan identification is a key element of American polit-
ical behavior, we know little about the nature and stability of Latino party iden-
tification. Studies of partisanship in the United States have generally relied on
national data sets like the American National Election Study (ANES) and Gallup
Polls that contain few Latinos. Most of the studies that have examined Latino
political behavior have had either relatively small samples or samples that are 
not nationally representative, rendering generalizations problematic (Brischetto
1987; Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner 1991; Kosmin and Keysar 1995; Welch and
Sigelman 1993). One exception is Uhlaner, Gray, and García (2000), who, using
the Latino National Political Survey (LNPS), a nationally representative sample,
find that policy positions affect Latino party identification more than ideology or
demographic variables like education and income (see also Uhlaner and García
2001). Since the LNPS was conducted in 1989–1990, the 2000 Latino Voter
Survey provides an important basis from which we can assess changes, if any, in
Latino partisanship over the last decade and use this analysis as a bridge to the
larger literature on partisanship.
As we saw above, studies of party identification have found three kinds of
factors affecting the nature and stability of party identification: social issues and
a person’s socialization process, the nature of the political environment and result-
ing policy preferences, and economic status. To determine which is most salient
for Latinos, we develop a fully specified model that looks at the effects of social,
political, and economic factors on Latino partisanship. Yet, it is important to note
that previous research about Latino party identification said little about the causal
relationship among these factors, a topic that has been of concern in research
about partisanship in American political life (see especially Franklin and Jackson
1983; Markus and Converse 1979; and Page and Jones 1979). In this analysis,
we follow previous studies of Latino partisanship and examine causal flow only
in one direction—we look at the impact of issue, economic, and demographic
factors on partisanship and not the reverse. While this does risk potential biases
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in our multivariate analysis if our assumption of unidirectional causation is incor-
rect, we wish to maintain continuity with past research so that our results can be
easily compared to those from the 1989–1990 LNPS. In addition, we are con-
cerned that current methodological tools do not allow for easy or accurate esti-
mation of multi-equation causal models with discrete dependent variables.1
Survey Methodology and Research Design
To test our model, we use the 2000 Latino Voter Study conducted by the
Knight-Ridder News Organization, which interviewed 2,721 likely Latino voters
from May 26, 2000, through June 15, 2000.2 The survey was conducted in English
and Spanish, and the telephone interviewing was done by International Commu-
nications Research of Media, Pennsylvania. The sample contains 611 respondents
from California, 600 from Texas, 608 from Florida, and 600 from New York—
the four states with the largest populations of Latino voters. Interviews were also
conducted with 302 Latinos from eight other states: New Jersey, New Mexico,
Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Connecticut. Overall,
these twelve states contain approximately 90% of the national population of 
registered Latino voters, ensuring this survey is nationally representative of 
the Latino electorate. The sample’s national margin of error was 2%. The survey
restricted interviewing to likely Latino voters, limiting our hypothesis testing to
only Latinos who are registered and likely to vote.3 This data set also restricts our
analysis in another way because members of other racial and ethnic groups—
Anglos, African Americans, Asian Americans, and others—were not interviewed
as part of this study.4 Yet, despite its limitations, this data set is the largest and
most recent study available to examine the political attitudes of the group being
courted by both political parties: Latino likely voters.
34 R. Michael Alvarez and Lisa García Bedolla
1 Alvarez and Glasgow (2000) conclude their discussion of the methodology for estimating nonre-
cursive models with one binary and one continuous dependent variable: “More work on estimation
techniques for other types of nonrecursive models, involving different types of discrete dependent
variables, is needed. Unfortunately, little is known about the finite sample properties of nonrecursive
choice models with discrete dependent variables” (164). We prefer to wait for the development of
appropriate methodological techniques before attempting to estimate a nonrecursive model of Latino
party identification.
2 A collection of the major stories written using this survey data set can be found at
http://www0.mercurycenter.com/local/center/lpoll0723.htm.
3 Only registered Latinos were contacted. A five-question filter determined who were “likely
voters”: respondents had to state that they were 18 years of age or older; were willing to conduct an
interview in English or Spanish; considered him or herself of Latino or Hispanic origin; were regis-
tered in the local precinct or election district; and were extremely likely, very likely, or somewhat
likely to “vote in the upcoming election for president on November 7.” If a respondent failed any of
these stages, the interview was terminated.
4 A direct comparison, then, of factors that might influence Latino partisanship differently than that
of other racial and ethnic groups is impossible with this particular survey. This is an obvious ques-
tion for future research.
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The dependent variable in our analysis is the respondent’s stated partisan affil-
iation. The 2000 Latino Voter Survey used a standard question to assess partisan
affiliation: “Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Democrat, a Repub-
lican, an independent, or something else?” This survey did not ask respondents
about the strength of their partisan affiliations.5
From this questionnaire, we used three sets of variables to test our main
hypotheses about Latino partisanship in the 2000 election: social and demo-
graphic questions, political and issue questions, and economic status questions.
Our measurement of these factors is based on a series of variables taken from the
survey. A full description of the coding of the variables is located in Appendix A.
In terms of social/demographic factors, we include variables for ethnic origins,
including national origin and whether or not the respondent was foreign born. We
also look at the effect of marital status, educational attainment, education, age,
gender, religion, and primary language spoken at home. To measure the impact
of political issues, we include indicators of the respondents’ opinions on seven
policy issues: abortion, illegal immigration, affirmative action, school vouchers,
government-sponsored health insurance, use of the government surplus, and gun
control. We also included measures for ideology and whether the respondent was
a new voter. Lastly, we have two economic measures in our model: a measure of
retrospective economic perceptions and the respondent’s family income.
Thus, our model of Latino voter partisanship takes the following functional
form:
As our dependent measure for partisanship is a categorical variable, based on
whether the voter identified as a Democrat, Republican or independent, we used
multinomial logit to estimate the effect of each independent measure on the rel-
ative probability that a voter would identify as an independent or Democrat, or
as a Republican or Democrat.6 The multinomial logit estimates allow for tests of
PID F Social and Demographic Factors Political Opinions and
Behavior and Economic Perceptions and Income
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)
      
     
,
.
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5 Our analysis examines only the direction of Latino voter partnership, and not the strength. While
earlier studies have looked at strength of Latino voter partnership (e.g., Uhlaner and García 2001),
we restrict our focus to direction since it is the more politically relevant issue regarding Latino voter
partisanship. By not studying strength we also sidestep the methodological debates over whether par-
tisanship is a unidimensional or multidimensional type of attitude for Latino voters (see Alvarez 1990;
Green 1988).
6 For detailed discussion of the multinomial logit model, see Aldrich and Nelson (1984), Greene
(2000), or Long (1997). The basic idea behind the multinomial logit model is that we observe dis-
crete and unordered outcomes. We specify the probability that each individual picks from one of the
set of outcomes as:
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the effects of each specific measure relative to other measures within the same
explanatory model (for example, for the impact of affirmative action opinions
relative to other political opinions) and across explanatory models (for example,
looking at the impact of affirmative action opinions relative to social factors like
age). Unfortunately, since the multinomial logit model produces estimates that
are nonlinear (the impact of a particular variable depends on the values of the
other variables in the model), they can be difficult to understand. So we trans-
form the multinomial logit parameters into odds ratios. The odds ratio (also
known as the relative risk ratio) is a measure of the relative odds of one outcome
being chosen relative to the baseline outcome, for a one-unit change in one of
the right-hand side variables.7
We also use the multinomial logit model to test the explanatory power of each
group of variables separately—social, political, and economic.8 Finally, in order
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where we have the outcomes coded 1, 2, and 3 (say, for example, as corresponding to Democratic,
Republican, or independent identification). Unfortunately, this model as specified above is not iden-
tified, so we “normalize” one of the parameter vectors (say for choice 1) to be equal to 1:
These probabilities are easily estimated by maximization of the following log-likelihood function:
where j is the number of choices, i denotes an individual, and n is the number of individuals in the
sample. Estimation produces the relative probabilities that an individual would pick outcome 2 rela-
tive to 1, and outcome 3 relative to 1, given their X values.
7 Recall from above that the probabilities for choosing outcomes 1 or 2 are:
Thus, the relative probability of choosing outcome 2 relative to the baseline category (1) is:
This is the odds or relative risk ratio (Greene 2000; Long 1997). The odds or relative risk ratio for a
one unit change in one of the right-hand side variables can easily be written from these expressions
as the exponentiated value of the respective coefficient: expb(2). We present the odds ratios in this
article because they are easy to compute and are readily understandable.
8 This stems from a simple but important fact about maximum likelihood estimation of multino-
mial logit models. We first estimate the log-likelihood of a fully specified model (that is, a model
with all of the right-hand side variables included), and we obtain the value of the log-likelihood 
function at convergence. We can respecify the model to include only a subset of the right-hand side
variables, called the constrained model; estimation of the constrained model yields a second log-like-
lihood value at convergence. The ratio of these two log-likelihoods has a convenient statistical dis-
tribution that lets us test for whether they are statistically distinct—in other words, does the addition
of the variables not in the constrained model add to the explanatory power of the fully specified
model? For details of the likelihood ratio test, see Greene (2000, 152–153).
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to provide a better sense of how these probabilities would operate in the “real
world,” we use our multinomial logit estimates to look at how change in one inde-
pendent variable would affect the probability that a “hypothetical” Latino voter
would identify with a particular party, holding all else constant. We discuss these
results in the next section.
Testing the Explanatory Models
We begin by examining the distribution of party identification in our sample.
In the entire sample of Latino voters, 56.6% reported Democratic affiliation,
while less than half of that amount reported Republican affiliation (24.5%). Just
over 13% reported that they were independents (13.2%), while 5.7% said they
were affiliated with no political party (4.6%) or some other third party (1.1%).
In comparison with voters from the 2000 American National Election Study
(ANES), 77% of whom were Anglo, 50% stated Democratic identification, 42%
stated Republican identification, and 8% were either independent or apolitical.9
Thus, Latino voters in the 2000 election were slightly more Democratic in 
identification than the most recent ANES sample of voters, and much less 
Republican.
In Table 1 we provide the breakdown of Latino voter identification by national
origin, Mexicans, Cubans, Puerto Ricans, and Central Americans, and compare
it to findings for registered voters from the LNPS. We find that Latino partisan-
ship has not changed dramatically over the last decade. Mexican-origin parti-
sanship has remained remarkably stable, with about 67% of respondents reporting
Democratic affiliation and about 13% Republican affiliation in both surveys.
Cuban-origin Latino voters, on the other hand, have become somewhat more
Republican: 66.7% in the LNPS reported Republican partisanship, while almost
70% of Cuban voters in the Latino Voter Survey stated Republican identification.
Puerto Ricans have also become slightly less Democratic, moving from 69.3%
in the LNPS to 64.4% of the respondents in this sample. Central Americans, who
were not part of the LNPS, are strongly Democratic in this sample, with 57%
stating Democratic identification. While the LNPS and 2000 Voter Survey are 
not exactly comparable in their sampling methods and question wording, the 
comparison of findings from the two surveys suggests that, as has been found in
macropartisanship studies generally, Latino partisanship within national origin
groups has been fairly stable over the last decade (Box-Steffensmeier and Smith
1996; Green and Palmquist 1990; Miller 1991).
Now we turn to our model, which we use to test the impact of each of the inde-
pendent variables, controlling for all other possible impacts, and we present these
The Foundations of Latino Voter Partisanship 37
9 The ANES estimates provide the partisanship for all respondents who said they voted in the 2000
presidential election, in the postelection interview. The preelection interview included a question that
asked respondents to say how likely they were to vote (the closest approximation to a likely voter
filter in the ANES): 51% of likely voters in the ANES stated Democratic partisanship, 39% Repub-
lican, and 9% were independent or apolitical.
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TABLE 2
Latino Party Identification Model
PR (Ind) v. PR (Dem) PR (Rep) v. PR (Dem)
MNL Odds Ratio MNL Odds Ratio
Foreign Born -.06 .94 .18 1.19
(.20) (.19) (.20) (.24)
Cuban .86* 2.35* 2.44* 11.45*
(.32) (.76) (.26) (3.03)
Mexican -.34* .71* -.51* .60*
(.20) (.15) (.21) (.13)
Puerto Rican -.16* .86* -.08 .93
(.09) (.07) (.08) (.08)
Married -.18 .84 .19 1.21
(.19) (.16) (.19) (.23)
Some HS -.58* .56* -.79* .45*
(.34) (.19) (.31) (.14)
High School -.37 .69 -.54* .58*
(.26) (.18) (.25) (.15)
Some College -.28 .75 -.30 .74
(.26) (.20) (.25) (.19)
2-Year College -.20 .82 -.04 .96
(.27) (.22) (.26) (.25)
18–30 .16 1.18 .49 1.63
(.33) (.39) (.32) (.52)
31–45 .05 1.05 .15 1.16
(.27) (.28) (.25) (.29)
46–60 .14 1.15 -.09 .92
(.27) (.31) (.25) (.23)
Women -.37* .69* -.03 .97
(.18) (.12) (.17) (.16)
Catholic .10 1.10 .02 1.02
(.19) (.21) (.18) (.18)
Spanish -.42 .66 -.12 .89
(.25) (.17) (.24) (.21)
Spanish-English -.06 .95 -.16 .86
(.21) (.20) (.21) (.18)
Abortion -.04 .96 -.39* .68*
(.12) (.11) (.12) (.08)
Illegal Immigration -.05 .95 -.12 .88
(.11) (.11) (.11) (.10)
Affirmative Action -.20* .82* -.27* .76*
(.09) (.08) (.09) (.07)
School Vouchers -.49* .61* -.63* .53*
(.18) (.11) (.17) (.09)
Gov’t Health Insurance -.43 .65 -1.22* .30*
(.28) (.18) (.24) (.07)
Gun Control .05 1.05 -.20* .82*
(.09) (.10) (.08) (.07)
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results in Table 2. Our multinomial logit model fits the data well, with a model
chi-square of 338.50 and a correct classification rate of 71.2%.
Beginning with the results for choosing independence versus Democratic 
identification, we see first that the national origin variables are statistically 
significant: Mexican- and Puerto Rican-origin Latino voters are less likely to be
independent than Democratic, but Cubans are more likely to be independent 
than Democratic. On the political side, school vouchers opponents, liberals, 
and not newly mobilized Latino voters are all more likely to be Democratic than
independent.
Next, in the Republican versus Democratic identification results, we see 
both national origin and education effects continue to be statistically significant:
Cubans are more likely to be Republican than Democratic, while Mexicans are
more likely to be Democratic than Republican, controlling for all other social,
economic, and political factors. This is similar to Uhlaner and García’s (2001)
findings from the LNPS and suggests that national origin has an important and
independent effect on Latino party identification. Regarding education, we see
that Latino voters at the lower rungs of the educational attainment ladder are more
likely to be Democratic than Republican, all things constant.
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TABLE 2 continued
PR (Ind) v. PR (Dem) PR (Rep) v. PR (Dem)
MNL Odds Ratio MNL Odds Ratio
Budget—Tax Cuts .68* 1.97* .47 1.60
(.33) (.64) (.30) (.48)
Budget—Debt Reduction .35 1.42 -.03 .97
(.26) (.37) (.26) (.25)
Budget—Domestic Spending -.15 .86 -.33* .72*
(.20) (.17) (.19) (.14)
Liberal -.65* .52* -.67* .51*
(.20) (.11) (.23) (.12)
Conservative -.20 .83 .74* 2.09*
(.21) (.17) (.19) (.39)
New Voter .58* 1.79* .19 1.21
(.24) (.44) (.26) (.31)
Economic Perceptions -.12 .89 -.18* .83*
(.09) (.08) (.08) (.07)
Income .01 1.01 .02 1.03
(.06) (.06) (.06) (.06)
Constant .98 3.03
(.70) (.64)
PR = probability MNL = Multinomial logit coefficient.
Standard errors are in parentheses * significant at p < .05 level, one-tailed test.
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In addition, many of the political variables are significant in the fully spe-
cified model. Of the issues, abortion, affirmative action, school vouchers, and
government-funded health insurance all have statistically significant effects—
each is negatively signed, meaning that Latino voters with more liberal opinions
are more likely to be Democratic than Republican. We also see significant results
for ideological beliefs, with liberals more likely to be Democratic and conserva-
tives more likely to be Republican.10
With regard to the economic variables in our model, we find that economic
perceptions have a statistically significant impact on the choice between Demo-
cratic and Republican partisanship. More positive economic perceptions lead
Latino voters to assume Democratic affiliations, while more negative perceptions
lead them to Republican identities. But consistent with the findings of other
studies of Latino partisanship, and in contrast to findings for Anglos, income does
not have a significant effect on Latino partisanship (Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner
1991; Nicholson and Segura 2001; Uhlaner and García 2001).
Overall, in terms of the relative magnitudes of the impact of different inde-
pendent variables in our model, we find that in the first equation (independent
versus Democratic identification), the strongest predictive variable is that for 
the new voters, followed by the national origin and issue opinion variables. In the
second equation (Republican versus Democratic identification), we find that by
far the strongest predictive variable is Cuban origin. The second strongest sig-
nificant predictive factor is conservative ideology, followed by the other signifi-
cant effects in this model.
Since the partisanship literature suggests social, political, and economic 
factors may each have an independent effect on party identification, we also ran
three different models—one with just the social variables, one with the political,
and one with the economic—and test the restriction that each set of variables 
has no impact on partisanship. We present the results of these chi-square tests in
Table 3.
The basic conclusion that is clear from Table 3 is that the social and political
models of Latino voter partisanship have stronger predictive power than the eco-
nomic model. Both the social and political models of partisanship have strong
and roughly similar chi-square values (181.24 for the social model and 179.73
for the political model), and the p-value for each test is less than .00, which is
highly significant, controlling for degrees of freedom (the number of parameters
in each test restricted to 0). However, the chi-square value for the economic model
is not strong (5.70) and is significant only at the p < .14 level, which is greater
than conventional levels of statistical significance, but not as strong as the other
The Foundations of Latino Voter Partisanship 41
10 Identifying the array of Latino voter opinion on each of these policy issues, and how those 
opinions vary across ethnic identities, is an important question that is beyond the scope of the 
present research. Some analysis of the issue opinions is reported at
<http://www0.mercurycenter.com/local/center/polldata.htm>, and in future research we will under-
take further analysis of issue opinions and their variance across national origin groups.
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models. Thus, while economic factors do “matter” in our model of Latino voter
partisanship, we conclude that Latino voter partisanship can best be explained by
social and political factors.11
This analysis does not shed much light, however, on the “real world” political
questions we discussed at the beginning of this article. If social and political
factors are most important to Latino partisanship, what social and political factors
would have to change before we would begin to see wholesale “conversion” of
Latinos from one political party to another? To address this question, we ran prob-
ability estimates to see what effect changes in particular economic and political
characteristics could be expected to have on Latino partisanship. Table 4 provides
a summary of these probability estimates.
Our “hypothetical” Latino voter is of Cuban or of Mexican national origin, is
the demographic average for the community—is unmarried, has a high school
education, is in the 18–30 age range, is male and Catholic, speaks English at
home—and has status quo issue opinions regarding abortion, illegal immigration,
affirmative action, school vouchers, government-funded health insurance, and
handgun control. He does not believe that the budget surplus should be used for
tax cuts, debt reduction, or increased social spending, identifies with a conser-
vative ideology, is a newly mobilized voter, perceives his family’s economic cir-
cumstances as unchanged in the past year, and is of moderate income ($25,000
to $35,000).
Given the “hypothetical” Latino voter, computing these probability estimates
is a matter of simply using the multinomial logit model estimates from the full
specification and the independent variable values implied by the assumed typical
or hypothetical voter. We then compute the estimated probability that either the
Cuban origin or Mexican origin voter would identify with the Democratic or
Republican parties, or as an independent—this is the “baseline” probability esti-
mate. We then change one of the independent variables to another value and
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TABLE 3
Summary of MNL Results
Social Political Economic
Chi-Square 181.24 179.73 5.70
p-Value .00 .00 .14
Degrees of Freedom 32 24 4
11 Unfortunately, the questions included in the Knight-Ridder survey limit our ability to assess the
impact of broader economic perceptions (other simple retrospective evaluations) or mediated retro-
spective evaluations. As a result, our specification of the economic or retrospective model of parti-
sanship falls far short of the broader model advocated by proponents of the economic model of
partisanship (e.g., Fiorina 1981). We hope that future studies of Latino political behavior will incor-
porate additional measures of economic perceptions.
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recompute the probability estimates. Thus, the difference between the baseline
and the recomputed probability estimate gives the estimated impact of such a
change in the independent variable on the hypothetical voter.12
The Republican campaign strategies discussed earlier are based on the assump-
tion that Latino social conservatism and socioeconomic mobility will move them
toward the Republican Party. There also have been questions as to whether newly
naturalized Latinos have moved to register as Democrats in reaction to unpopu-
lar Republican leaders like Newt Gingrich or due to their substantive support of
the Democratic party platform. To test these questions, we choose three variables
for our probability estimates: income, attitudes toward abortion, and support of
government-sponsored health care. We choose the first two variables because they
are mentioned most often as key to Republican “conversion” strategies. We
choose to look at support for government-sponsored health programs because, of
the political issues in the model, we believe this issue most reflects the respon-
dents’ attitudes regarding the role of government in providing social services—
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TABLE 4
Probability Effects for “Hypothetical” Latino Voter
Cuban Americans Mexican Americans
Democratic Independent Republican Democratic Independent Republican
Baseline .32 .21 .47 .78 .16 .06
Low Income .32 .21 .48 .78 .15 .06
High Income .30 .21 .49 .78 .16 .05
Men .32 .21 .47 .78 .16 .06
Women .34 .16 .50 .82 .11 .06
Restrict .26 .18 .57 .75 .16 .09
Abortion
Expand .38 .24 .38 .80 .15 .04
Abortion
Restrict .14 .14 .72 .64 .20 .17
Gov’t
Health
Insurance
Expand .53 .23 .24 .87 .11 .02
Gov’t
Health
Insurance
12 Technically, we simply substitute the estimated coefficients and fixed values into the probability
expressions presented above in note 6. This substitution allows us to produce an estimate of each
probability for the assumed voter type. Changing one of the fixed values of the independent variables
and recomputing the estimated probabilities gives us an estimate for the impact of that independent
variable, given the values of the other independent variables. This has been called the “first differ-
ence” methodology (King 1998).
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one of the main philosophical differences between the Democratic and Republi-
can parties. An analysis of the effect of this variable should give us some sense
of how rooted Latino partisanship is in the actual ideological positions of the two
parties.
Similar to our earlier findings, these probability estimates suggest that income
does not have a significant effect on Latino partisanship. A movement from low
income to high income results in no great change in either Mexican or Cuban
party identification. This indicates that contrary to expectations, increases in
Latino incomes should have little effect on Latino party identification.
Another issue that has been expected to move Latinos toward the Republican
party is attitudes toward abortion. This does not seem to be the case among
Mexican Americans. Mexican voters who decide they want to restrict abortion
become only 3% less likely to be Democratic and 3% more likely to be Repub-
lican. Changes in attitudes toward abortion have more of an effect on Cuban 
partisanship, with those for restriction becoming 10% more likely to identify 
as Republican and those for expansion becoming 6% more likely to identify as
Democrat. But given that socially conservative Mexicans are generally under-
stood to be the group most likely to move to the Republican party because of
their attitudes toward abortion, these findings suggest it is unlikely that will
happen in the near future.
The one political issue that does seem to have an important effect on Latino
partisanship is attitudes toward expansion or restriction of government health
insurance. Mexicans who want to restrict government health insurance are almost
three times as likely to identify as Republican and 14% less likely to identify as
Democrats. Cubans, on the other hand, are 21% more likely to identify Democ-
ratic if they favor expansion of government health insurance and are 25% more
likely to identify Republican if they are against it. Since government health insur-
ance is an important social safety net, the fact that changes in attitudes about it
have such a strong impact on party identification could mean that baseline Latino
partisanship is predicated on particular philosophical attitudes toward the role
and purpose of government. It could be that the baseline Mexican and Cuban
identify with Democrats and Republicans, respectively, because they agree with
those parties’ philosophies about the role of government in society. This indicates
that Latino partisanship may be philosophically “deeper” than generally has been
assumed and that changes in Latino partisanship would require shifts in these
basic positions about the role of government.
Discussion and Conclusions
While we do not have specific generational information for the new voters in
this sample, our findings suggest that Latino partisanship evolves over time in
the United States. Newer voters and younger Latinos seem to lean toward inde-
pendence, while older Latinos have more established partisan attachments. As
Latino voters become more socialized into the political system, they tend to move
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away from independence and toward the dominant party for their group—Democ-
rats for Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans and Republicans for Cuban Amer-
icans (Uhlaner and García 2001). The fact that this partisan identification is based
on policy issue preferences indicates that unless the parties fundamentally change
their issue positions, these Latinos’ identifications with those parties should
remain fairly stable.
Yet, this raises the question of why national origin should matter so much in
this model, especially being of Cuban origin. In this case, national origin may be
acting as a proxy for each group’s political integration process. Cuban Americans
have had a historically unique migration and settlement experience. They have
been incorporated into American politics within particular political, institutional,
and ideological constraints that have moved them strongly toward identification
with the Republican Party (Moreno 1997). Mexican Americans and Puerto
Ricans, on the other hand, have had historical experiences that have moved them
toward the Democratic Party (Pycior 1997). This political experience could be
what Latinos “learn” over time in the United States and could be replacing
parental socialization as a way to transmit partisanship across generations (Niemi
and Jennings 1991). Of course, once the parent is socialized into a particular iden-
tification, it is reasonable to assume the intergenerational transmission of that
attachment will function much as it does in other communities, making Latino
partisanship less variable over time and across generations.
One of the questions raised at the beginning of this article was the relative mal-
leability of Latino party identification. Current party appeals to the Latino com-
munity reflect a general feeling that this group is “in play” politically. Given that
over 40% of the Latino community is currently foreign born and that continued
migration makes it likely that that proportion will remain fairly constant for the
foreseeable future, our findings suggest that there will continue to be a large
group of Latinos leaning toward independence or waiting to attach themselves to
a political party. Yet, this is not to say that these Latinos are the equivalent of a
political tabula rasa—our findings indicate that their eventual attachments will
be defined by their policy preferences and the historical political experiences of
their national origin groups.
Both the traditionalists and revisionists in the partisanship debate agree that
there is a window of time within which party identification can change and that
it tends to crystallize with age, but they disagree about the size and timing of 
that window. It could be that the particular nature of the Latino community in
terms of nativity means that immigrant and younger Latinos have a larger window
than the native born. Or it could be that the Latino community’s unique genera-
tional makeup allows us to see a socialization process that has already occurred
among Anglos and white ethnic immigrants. At the very least, comparative lon-
gitudinal studies of Anglo and Latino partisanship would be useful for tracking
the evolution of this process.
We conclude that Latinos are an important group to use in the study of 
political beliefs and attitudes. Their experiences with the American social and
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political world have led to different dynamics in their acquisition of partisan-
ship. Furthermore, there is considerable heterogeneity within the Latino 
community, across groups of different national origins and across generations.
Much research remains to be done to understand how Latinos learn about the
American political system and how that learning is translated from generation to
generation.
Appendix A: Variables and Coding
Foreign Born: 1 = Foreign Born; 0 = Native Born
Cuban: 1 = Cuban; 0 = Not Cuban
Mexican: 1 = Mexican; 0 = Not Mexican
Puerto Rican: 1 = Puerto Rican; 0 = Not Puerto Rican
Married: 1 = Married; 0 = Not Married
Some HS: 1 = Some High School; 0 = More Education
High School: 1 = Finished High School; 0 = Did not finish or finished
some college
Some College: 1 = Some college; 0 = Less or more education
2-yr. college: 1 = 2 year college or vocational school; 0 = Less or more
education
4-yr. college: 1 = 4 year degree or more; 0 = Less education (excluded
category in MNL analysis)
18–30: 1 = aged 18–30; 0 = 31 or older
31–45: 1 = aged 31–45; 0 = 18–30 or 46 or older
46–60: 1 = aged 46–60; 0 = younger than 46 or older than 60
60 and over 1 = aged 60 and over; 0 = younger than 60 (excluded 
category in MNL analysis)
Women: 1 = female; 0 = male
Catholic: 1 = Catholic; 0 = another religion
Spanish: 1 = Spanish primary home language; 0 = English or
Spanish and English
Spanish-English: 1 = Spanish and English primary home language; 0 =
other language
Abortion: 2 = Abortion should be easier to obtain; 1 = stay the
same; 0 = be more restricted
Illegal Immigration: 2 = U.S. government doing too much; 1 = right amount;
0 = not doing enough
Affirmative Action: 2 = Programs should be expanded; 1 = programs should
be continued; 0 = programs should be reduced
School Vouchers: 1 = opposed; 0 = in favor
Gov’t Health Ins: 1 = in favor; 0 = opposed
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Budget—Tax cut: 1 = in favor; 0 = opposed
Budget—Debt: 1 = in favor; 0 = opposed
Budget—Domestic: 1 = in favor; 0 = opposed
Guns: Additive scale of responses to four questions about gun
control: 1 = favor; 0 = oppose. The four questions con-
cerned: (a) a nationwide ban on people carrying a 
concealed weapon; (b) requiring trigger locks to be sold
with all new handguns; (c) requiring people to get a
license in order to legally own a handgun; and (d) requir-
ing all handgun owners to attend a course on gun safety.
We verified the linear scale in three ways. First, a simple
principal factor analysis demonstrated that all four gun
control questions had roughly similar factor loadings:
.42528, .58439, .55258, and .54143, respectively.
Second, we computed the Cronbach’s alpha reliability
statistic to compare the correlation between the scale we
use and the underlying factor; the alpha statistic is
.6379, and the square root of the alpha statistic is .7987,
showing a strong correlation between the gun control
scale and the underlying factor. Third, we computed the
item-test correlations for each gun control item (the cor-
relation between the particular item and the additive
scale) and the item-rest correlations (the correlation
between each item and an additive scale formed from
the remaining items). Both sets of correlations show evi-
dence that our additive scale is appropriate: the item-test
correlations are .6397, .7373, .7085, and .6982, respec-
tively; the item-rest correlations are .3367, .4784, .4315,
and .4123, respectively.
Liberal: 1 = Liberal; 0 = Conservative or Moderate
Conservative: 1 = Conservative; 0 = Liberal or Moderate
New Voter: 1 = Did not vote in 1996 presidential election; 0 = Did
vote
Economic Percept: 1 = family situation improved in past four years; 0 =
stayed the same or got worse
Income: 7 = More than $100,000; 6 = $75,000 to less than
$100,000; 5 = $50,000 to less than $75,000; 4 = $35,000
to less than $50,000; 3 = $25,000 to less than $35,000;
2 = $15,000 to less than $25,000; 1 = less than $15,000
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